We focus on a relatively neglected area of the tax-compliance literature in economics, the behaviour of firms. We examine the impact of alternative audit rules on receipts from a tax on profits in the context of strategic inter-dependence of firms. In the market firms may compete in terms of either output or price. The enforcement policy can have an effect on firms' behaviour in two dimensions -their market decisions as well as their compliance behaviour. An appropriate design of the enforcement policy can thus have a "double dividend" by manipulating firms in both dimensions.
Introduction
The behaviour of …rms is sometimes glossed over in the analysis of economic analysis of tax policy. In the analysis of tax compliance it is often omitted altogether. This omission is rather odd: tax inspectors typically use background knowledge about markets and industries in order to re…ne the monitoring and auditing process and, even if this knowledge is exercised in rule-of-thumb fashion, one would expect it to be in conformity with rational economic principles. Of course, …rms do make an appearance in the standard compliance literature, but only in a rather specialised manner and in connection with rather specialised questions. In this paper we take a step toward a richer analysis by focusing on corporate tax-evasion and market decisions in an oligopolistic setting. We examine the impact of alternative audit rules on receipts from a tax on pro…ts, allowing for both compliance responses and output or price responses by the …rms. Why does this alternative focus make such a di¤erence to the analysis?
Most models in the literature focus on a simple proportionate audit rule in an adapted version of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, as though …rms habitually play the dual roles of producers and gamblers. In nearly all the standard models of corporate compliance there is a fundamental separation result between the production and concealment activities. This conclusion appears to be robust to alternative assumptions about market structure and the speci…cations of …rms'objectives.
However, taxes are not neutral in a setting where the behaviour of the tax authority depends on all the declarations in a particular market. The tax authority can exploit this market-based information and so, in the light of this, we investigate the implications of using a more intelligent audit rule that is easily implementable. The idea is that a change in audit rule will introduce a regime where tax enforcement can in ‡uence output decisions. By conditioning an individual audit on the declaration of all …rms the authority creates an externality. The externality can be seen as generating two dividends: (a) less tax evasion (b) an e¢ ciency improvement. The reduction in tax evasion is a direct result of the tax authority's making better use of available information from the collection of …rms. The move toward static e¢ ciency arises because of an induced increase in output generated by the switch in enforcement regime.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the story of corporate tax compliance as conventionally presented in the literature and outlines the model presented here; section 3 examines the equilibrium behaviour of …rms in the two main dimensions and sections 4 to 6 present the main res-1 ults, while Section 7 provides an example illustrating the results. Section 8 concludes.
2 The setting and model outline
Background
The literature on models of corporate tax compliance usually focuses on one of two relatively simple market structures -competitive price taking or monopoly. The elements of such a model are simple: a risk-neutral pricetaking …rm with constant marginal costs and a determinate demand curve faces a proportionate pro…ts tax The sole source of uncertainty is created by a combination of the …rm's actions (the …rm can conceal pro…t, but at a cost) and the government's tax audit (a given audit probability with a known penalty proportionate to the amount concealed). The …rm conceals up to the point where the marginal cost of concealment equals the marginal reduction of expected tax rate, a rule that is independent of the …rm's output level (Cowell 2004) .
The advantage of this approach is its simpli…ed behavioural analysis of the tax-evading …rm: the "production department" can get on with determining the level of output in the light of market conditions; the "taxmanagement department" separately decides on matters of pro…t declaration. But there are several three causes for concern:
The separability result is clearly arti…cial and it is not clear that it would survive in a more interesting model of the industry.
The type of audit rule used is naive in that it does not make use of low-cost or costless information that would be available to the taxauthority from the …rms'reports.
The argument that taxation policy has no e¤ect on output seems inappropriate in the light of the perception that corporate taxation does have an e¤ect on …rms' activities. Of course this perception may be misplaced, but it would be useful to know whether there is a good theoretical case for considering a real e¤ect of taxation and tax-enforcement policy.
To address these questions we develop a simple model that will permit a somewhat richer version of market structure and behaviour by the tax authority. The model consists of a conventional story of individual …rms, an industry with a given number of …rms, a simple tax function and an audit rule. We will brie ‡y examine each of these in turn.
The industry
We focus on an oligopolistic market with a …xed number of …rms producing a single homogeneous output. The …rms compete in a standard model of market interaction: we will consider both quantity-competition (Cournot) and price-competition (Bertrand) versions of the model. Each …rm has a simple production technology, the details of which are subsumed within a conventional pro…t function. It faces a requirement to pay tax and knows that it has opportunities for evasion. This enables us to focus on perhaps the most appealing and relatively uncomplicated case of strategic interdependence amongst …rms in order to examine the potential role of taxation policy in a market form that is not purely mechanistic. One consequence of this is that, in the context of quantity competition, we would expect the standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium to emerge in which output is above the level corresponding to joint-pro…t maximisation but below that characterising economic e¢ ciency. In what follows we describe the environment for …rms competing in quantities. The case of price competition can be obtained by exchanging q i (quantity produced by …rm i) for p i (price set by …rm i) as arguments of the gross pro…t functions.
Taxation and pro…ts
Let us set out the role of the tax system in the objective function for the …rms. Formally there is a population N := f1; :::; ng of …rms where N is exogenous. Firm i makes gross pro…t Rather than limiting itself to treating each d i in isolation the tax authority can base an audit rule on the information provided by the collection of declarations d. This crucial point is developed in section 2.6.
We assume a linear pro…ts tax and a …ne for detected tax evasion, that is proportional to the concealed pro…t. 1 There is no loss-o¤set or compensation: subsidies are not given for losses, nor are bonuses paid for revealed over-compliance. So the legal tax liability is de…ned as
where t is the tax rate. The tax payable depending on the pro…t declaration if no audit takes place is
So the pro…t net of taxes if no audit takes place can be written as:
After an audit, if a …rm is found to have underpaid tax it is required to make up the shortfall and also to pay a …ne F :
We assume a …ne proportional to undeclared pro…t. With the proportionality factor f the …ne becomes:
Concealment cost
E¤ective concealment requires that the …rm incur a real resource cost. 2 We do not assume a speci…c functional form for this. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the concealment cost rises with the pro…t concealed. Additionally, we assume that the marginal concealment cost are also increasing in the pro…t concealed. For declarations which are not higher than the actual pro…t
1 Note that the way the …ne is de…ned may play a crucial role for the e¤ect changes in the tax rate have on declaration behaviour. For the purposes of our paper, which focuses on the analysis of the impact of a relative audit rule, the formulation of the …ne is not crucial.
2 These cost e.g. could stem from buying in specialist advise, reorganizing transaction paterns or purchasing avoidance schemes.
where primes denote derivatives. We further assume that there are no bene…ts for over-reporting and that concealment cost are zero for truthful declarations:
Objective function
For expositional reasons, we assume the managers of the …rm to be riskneutral. Our analysis does not crucially depend on the risk preferences assumed. 3 Let us denote the audit probability for …rm i, which is determined by the tax authority, as (i; d): 4 The audit probability for …rm i may or may not depend on the vector of all declarations in the industry. If it does depend on d in a certain way we will speak of a relative audit rule (see section 2.6 for details). If the audit probability is …xed and does not depend on either the declaration of the …rm in question or the declarations of the other …rms in the industry then we speak of a …xed audit rule.
Given a relative audit rule we can write the objective function of the …rm as its expected payo¤:
The appropriate objective function under the …xed audit rule can be found by replacing the expression (i; d) by a given number f ix 2 (0; 1) in Equation (3).
Audit rule
Suppose the authority assigns the audit probability (i; d) to …rm i where the individual audit probability is conditional on d. Then we can use the following de…nition:
De…nition 1 A relative audit rule is a function : N R n 7 ! [0; 1] that satis…es the following conditions:
@d i 0 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng (D1)
The …rst property (D1) takes into account that ceteris paribus a higher pro…t declaration should lead to a lower audit probability. Lower declarations make the authority more suspicious and induce higher audit probabilities. Condition D2 captures the relative nature of the audit rule: if a competitor increases its declaration then this increases i's probability of being audited. The rationale behind this property is that the observation of a high declaration of one …rm makes the authority believe that the pro…t situation in the industry was good for the …scal year in question. Then it should shift its attention to the …rms with comparatively low declarations, such as i, because it becomes more likely that those …rms have under-reported their pro…ts.
Put di¤erently, an authority that does not know the pro…t situation in an industry on the one hand and that on the other hand believes that pro…ts in an industry are correlated, should put a higher probability of tax evasion on a received declaration if the declarations of other …rms increase. This strategy corresponds to an implicit model of industry pro…ts that contains an industry-speci…c common shock component the authority cannot observe. However, observing the level of declarations the authority can draw inferences on this common shock component.
So di¤erences in declarations indicate …rm-speci…c unobserved shocks and/or tax evasion. A higher pro…t declaration of one …rm renders tax evasion of the others more likely for their given declarations.
The third part of the de…nition (D3) captures the widely applied practice of tax authorities to assign a certain amount of resources to an industry. 5 Technically (D3) keeps the expected number of audits in an industry constant.
Equilibrium
In this section we outline the optimisation problem of the …rms. We focus on quantity competition under a relative audit rule. Bertrand competition is obtained by changing the choice variable in the competition stage. For a …xed audit rule we just set the partial derivatives of the detection probability with respect to the declaration of any …rm to zero.
Information and timing
Let us focus on quantity competition in the …rst instance. We can imagine the following simple sequence of decisions and actions.
0 Firms learn the tax and …ne system and the audit rule that is in place for the coming tax year.
1 Firms choose quantities.
2 Firms observe the gross pro…ts of all market participants and then choose their pro…t declarations.
It is the interaction of …rms in stages one and two that makes the problem particularly interesting. Implicitly, we assume that the …rms have an information advantage over the authority. Firms are better informed about the level of pro…ts within an industry than the tax authority; this gives the relative audit rule "bite." This situation could be applicable in an industry with stochastic demand shocks, for example: a …rm can infer from its own pro…t what the equilibrium pro…ts of the other …rms must look like. In standard models the extreme assumption is made that …rms have no information advantage over the tax authority at all; for simplicity we take the opposite extreme where …rms know the pro…ts in the industry, while the authority does not. 6
The declaration stage
We begin with the stage where …rms make the declaration to the tax authority. The …rms will treat the gross pro…ts as given when they decide about their declarations. First of all, note that there is no incentive for a …rm 6 An intermediate model where …rms obtain a more accurate signal about the level of pro…ts in the industry than the tax authority seems to be most realistic. We chose the extreme case model for two reasons: (a) tractability and (b) the basic intuition of an externality imposed by a relative audit rule is not obscured by the signal sturcture.
to declare more than the pro…t actually made, since no reward is given for over-compliance. Additionally, it is clear that the optimal declaration for a …rm which incurs losses is to report truthfully. This is the case, because declaring a higher loss than actually su¤ered does not lead to any subsidies, but concealment cost and potentially …nes have to be paid. We now turn to the situation where tax evasion is optimal. Assume a positive gross pro…t ( g i > 0). Then the …rst-order condition for an interior solution is given by:
The second-order condition is:
Therefore a su¢ cient condition for the second-order condition to be satis…ed is
To simplify matters we only consider audit rules that satisfy (D4). Given positive pro…ts and the global concavity of the objective function in …rm i's own declaration we can establish conditions for an interior solution. There is an interior solution whenever
Inspection shows that an interior solution is likely whenever a. marginal concealment costs are high for extensive tax evasion, which prevents zero-declarations, and b. a generally low level of detection probabilities and a low marginal evasion-cost for the …rst unit of pro…t concealed exist, which gives incentives for evasion.
However, because of the endogeneity of the detection probability, there is no general condition which depends only on parameters that will ensure an internal solution. 
The market-response stage
Now consider the stage that determines the …rms'pro…ts: depending on the assumptions made about the nature of competition in the market each …rm makes a decision about output or price. Clearly the standard issue of the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies will arise. Assuming that the strategy space is compact and non-empty and that the objective functions are continuous and strictly quasi-concave in the choice variable ensures a unique equilibrium in pure strategies -see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , p.34. To avoid complications we assume for now that these conditions to hold. 7 The assumption of uniqueness is dropped in the next section.
Take a market where …rms compete in quantities -the case of competition on price is analysed below. Then the …rst-order condition for optimal output given that …rms will …le (and expect the competitors to …le) an optimal tax return for any possible pro…t distribution can be written as:
The asterisks indicate that the changes of the optimal declaration (of all …rms) due to change in the quantity supplied have to be taken into account. Note that the change in the equilibrium audit-probability @ (i; d)=@q i includes the e¤ects of declaration changes of all …rms due to the change in observed pro…ts. Solving the …rst-order condition for the declaration (4) for C 0 and substituting in the …rst-order condition from above gives:
(6) The set of …rst-order conditions, one for each …rm, characterises the equilibrium. Using this characterisation of equilibrium we can now present the main results in three steps: sections 4 to 6.
Compliance decisions
In this section we compare the di¤erent e¤ects …xed and relative audit rules have on the extent of tax evasion. We …nd that a relative audit rule leads to less tax evasion than a comparable …xed audit rule if the declaration stage has an interior solution. The result derived is not dependent on whether …rms compete in quantities or prices.
The intuition for the result is rather simple: in addition to the typical incentives provided by a …xed detection probability and the corresponding …ne, a relative audit rule provides a further incentive to increase the declaration, as this decreases the detection probability. Suppose we have a …xed detection probability f ix then the …rst-order condition of an individual …rm in the declaration stage becomes:
Recall that the …rst-order condition under a relative audit rule is given by
In order to compare the two rules we need a criterion that makes the two regimes comparable. Hence we require the equilibrium detection probability in the relative-rule scenario to be equal to the …xed detection probability. This ensures that the audit costs incurred by the authority are equal under both regimes. Setting = f ix and keeping the pro…ts the same in both cases implies that the two …rst-order conditions only di¤er by the term
This is just the additional incentive to increase the declaration in order to reduce the detection probability, which leads to higher declarations under a relative audit rule.
Proposition 1 In an interior declaration equilibrium a relative audit rule leads to less evasion than a …xed rule with the same detection probability.
Proof. Pick an interior d i 2 (0; i ) such that for a given = f ix condition (7) holds. Then under the …xed audit rule the declaration is optimal. For this d i the marginal expected pro…t of declaring an additional dollar under a …xed rule is
which is positive for an interior solution as @ (i; d)=@d i < 0; i i < 0: Assumption (D4) ensures global concavity of E i in d i ; which implies the claimed property.
So, in a situation where there is competition among the few, switching to a more intelligent audit rule yields an immediate dividend -less evasion.
Output decisions
However, there is more that can be said on behalf of the relative audit rule. As we noted earlier (section 2.1), in simple competitive and noncompetitive models the tax-enforcement parameters do not distort output although this result depends on the way in which the audit probability and penalty rate are formulated (Lee 1998) . So too in our model: it is clear that there is no e¤ect on output if audit probabilities are independent of the declarations.
In what follows we will show that for typical Cournot games with unique equilibria in pure strategies a switch to relative auditing will increase aggregate quantity and thus e¢ ciency. We exclude underlying Cournot games with multiple equilibria in order to have a de…nite reference for our comparative statics analysis. 8 Suppose we have a smooth Cournot oligopoly with a compact strategy space where inverse demand p(Q) is decreasing and logconcave in Q: Furthermore assume that production costs K are such that K 00 i (q i ) p 0 (Q) > 0 for all …rms. Note that this does not exclude asymmetry with regard to the cost functions. The conditions above are well-known to be su¢ cient for N-player Cournot games to have a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 9 In what follows we refer to oligopolies as regular if they satisfy these conditions. In a such regular oligopolies the best response functions of …rms have non-positive slopes larger than 1:
We …rst establish that the best-response quantity of an individual …rm under relative auditing is larger than under a …xed audit rule. As mentioned above under a …xed audit rule the quantity decision is equivalent to the decision in an oligopoly without taxation and tax enforcement.
Proposition 2 Under an independent audit rule output is independent of the evasion decision and equals the Cournot quantities.
Proof. In the declaration stage the …rst-order condition for an independent audit rule is identical to the one under a relative audit rule from (4). The only di¤erence is that the …rst-order conditions of di¤erent …rms are not linked through and @ (i; d)=@d i . The …rst-order condition on the output stage is also very similar to the corresponding condition under a relative audit rule (5). The only di¤erence here is that @ (i; d i )=@q i does not contain any indirect in ‡uences via changes in the competitors declarations due to a changed output. 10 Substituting the …rst-order condition for declaration into the …rst-order condition for output choices gives the condition
which only holds if @ g i =@q i = 0: This implies that the oligopolists choose the Cournot quantity.
We now turn to relative auditing. Denote the best response of …rm i in the regular Cournot game as BR C i (q i ), while BR R i (q i ) gives the best response correspondence under a relative audit rule.
Lemma 3 Assume that the market organisation has the form of a regular Cournot oligopoly. Then
Proof. Take the …rst-order condition for the quantity choices from (6):
Note that term (c) is positive, since 1 t + t (i; d) > 0, i i 0, and @ (i; d) =@d i 0. So the sign for (b) has to be the opposite of term (a); and if (a) is zero then (b) has to be zero as well. Recall that @ g i =@q i = 0 is the …rst-order condition for optimal output in a Cournot oligopoly. So for a higher output, which is closer to the socially e¢ cient output @ g i =@q i < 0 has to hold. This implies that (a) needs to be positive for our claim to be true. As i i < 0 and @ (i; d) =@d j > 0 for any interior solution, the crucial question is whether @d j =@q i < 0 holds. The declaration of …rm j will be in ‡uenced by a change of q i through two di¤erent channels: the change in the own pro…t and the reactions of other …rms due to their changed pro…ts. Using the implicit function theorem we can write …rm j's subgame perfect reaction to …rm i changing its quantity as:
where
The whole term is negative if < 0; C 00 > 0, @ (j; d)=@d j < 0; and @ g j =@q i < 0. If so, then (a) is negative, as all competitors have qualitatively identical …rst-order e¤ects. This shows that the optimal quantity (or all optimal quantities if BR R i (q i ) is a correspondence rather than a function) is higher than the best response under Cournot for the same output vector of the other …rms:
This result is su¢ cient to ensure that the aggregate quantity under a relative auditing rule is larger if a) the oligopoly is regular and symmetric and b) the equilibrium under relative auditing is also symmetric. However, by using some properties of a regular oligopoly we can generalise this result considerably. Denote the aggregate equilibrium quantities under a relative rule as Q R and under ordinary Cournot (which is the same as under a …xed rule) as Q C : Then we can establish the following more general result.
Proposition 4 If the underlying Cournot oligopoly is regular then any interior equilibrium outcome under a relative auditing rules satis…es Q R > Q C :
Proof. Fix the quantities of N 2 …rms and investigate the location of the best responses of the two remaining …rms, say 1 and 2; under relative auditing. Inequality (10) from the previous lemma tells us that for every given quantity vector of the N 2 remaining …rms
hold. So the candidates q 1 and q 2 for mutual best responses given the others' quantities have to jointly satisfy:
is strictly monotonous in a regular oligopoly for interior equilibrium we can invert the second condition and write:
where BR 1 2 (q 2 ) denotes the inverse best response function of …rm 2. From condition (8) for a regular Cournot game we can conclude that:
We have BR C 1 (q 2 ) = BR 1 2 (q 2 ), where q 2 is …rm two's quantity in the equilibrium of the reduced two-…rm game for given quantities of the others. Because the slopes are di¤erent this implies:
Now given that the isoquant for aggregate output q 1 (q 2 ) for the Cournot equilibrium of the reduced game has slope 1 and satis…es q 1 (q 2 ) = BR C 1 (q 2 ) = BR 1 2 (q 2 ) we can conclude:
So the aggregate quantity of two …rms under relative auditing is larger than without for any given quantity of the others. As this is true for any two …rms and any given quantity of the other …rms we can conclude that any equilibrium output vector q R is such that Q R > Q C :
The result, illustrated in Figure 1 , might seem surprising. After all, what does a …rm gain from extending its output beyond the Cournot level? By increasing output in this way it would seem that a …rm reduces its own gross pro…t and the gross pro…ts of the competitors; this would seem to be a loss rather than a gain.
However, recall the role of the informational externality here. As q i increases, the pro…ts of other …rms g i fall, so d i , the optimal declarations of the other …rms, fall. Therefore the probability of audit of …rm i decreases; which in turn gives …rm i some more scope for evasion. By increasing output beyond the Cournot quantity a …rm intends to trade some gross pro…t for a better environment for evasion. This externality can easily be identi…ed by the di¤erences in the …rst-order conditions for the quantity choices under the di¤erent rules. Comparing the …rst-order conditions shows that the externality under relative auditing is given by the term
which describes the in ‡uence of …rm i's quantity on i 0 s expected payo¤ by the indirect e¤ect on the other …rms' declarations and hence …rm i's audit probability. As the other …rms will decrease their declaration if their pro…t is decreased, which decreases …rm i's audit probability, …rm i has an incentive to sabotage the other …rms'pro…ts by producing more than under the equilibrium of the underlying Cournot oligopoly. So increasing output as described above reduces the impact of the externality imposed by the authority's relative audit rule. A lower gross pro…t helps closing the gap of the net pro…ts between the situation after an audit ( ) and the situation where no audit took place ( ). Since all …rms have the same incentives this does not really work for the …rms, they all try to reduce the impact of the externalities by increasing their quantities. So they are all worse o¤ than if they just had produced the Cournot quantity on the …rst stage. The externalities imposed by the authority on the pro…t declaration spill over into the output-decision stage.
Price decisions
Now consider the impact of relative auditing if …rms compete in prices. Obviously, a pro…t-tax enforcement in a deterministic world only makes sense if …rms make positive pro…ts. Therefore we consider Bertrand oligopolies with di¤erentiated products only. In what follows we concentrate on an underlying smooth and (strictly) supermodular Bertrand oligopoly with differentiated substitutes, which has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. A su¢ cient condition for uniqueness is that the best responses of the …rms (BR 1 ( ); :::; BR N ( )) are a contraction, which is satis…ed for a range of standard demand and cost systems (Vives 1999, p 150) . We will refer to such a price game as a regular Bertrand oligopoly with substitutes.
The second stage of the tax-evasion game is obviously not a¤ected by changing the market structure and choice variable. Firms still maximize their expected payo¤s by simultaneously choosing pro…t declarations given the pro…ts determined in the competition stage. The …rst-order conditions (4) for optimal declarations do not change. This implies that the …rst dividend of relative auditing -less evasion for a given auditing budget -is also present under Bertrand competition. The more interesting question is whether a relative audit rule enhances e¢ ciency under Bertrand competition in the same way as it does under Cournot competition. Note that an audit rule enhances e¢ ciency in price competition with di¤erentiated products if it lowers equilibrium prices. Denote the best response of …rm i to the prices of the competitors in the regular Bertrand game as BR B i (p i ), while BR R i (p i ) gives the best response correspondence under a relative audit rule.
Lemma 5 Assume that the market organisation has the form of a regular Bertrand oligopoly. Then
Proof. Take the …rst-order condition for the price choices, which is (6) with quantities are replaced by the prices:
To prove our claim we have to show that this …rst-order condition requires @ g i =@p i > 0: For this to hold we need (a) to be negative for p i > 0; as (c) is always positive. As i i < 0 and @ (i; d) =@d j > 0 for any interior solution, the crucial question is whether @d j =@p i > 0 holds. Using the implicit function theorem we can write …rm j's subgame perfect reaction to …rm i changing its price as:
where is again given by (9). Given < 0; C 00 > 0, @ (j; d)=@d i < 0; and @ g j =@p i > 0 this term is positive since. Consequently, we need @d j =@p i > 0 for the …rst-order condition to hold, which proves our claim that
With this result in hand it is straightforward to show that a relative audit rule leads to an equilibrium with lower prices for all …rms in a regular Bertrand oligopoly with di¤erentiated substitutes.
Proposition 6 If the underlying Bertrand oligopoly with di¤ erentiated substitutes is regular then any interior equilibrium outcome under a relative audit rule satis…es p R i < p B i 8i:
Proof. Fix the prices of N 2 …rms. According to the lemma above, under relative auditing potential mutual best responses of the two remaining …rms 1; 2 have to satisfy:
where the …xed prices of the other …rms are omitted for simplicity of notation. We can invert the second part of the condition above as best responses are strictly increasing for interior equilibria. The condition for a possible mutual best response becomes:
As both BR B 1 (p 2 ) and BR 1 2 (p 2 ) are increasing in p 2 with a …xed point (p B 1 ; p B 2 ); which is the Bertrand equilibrium in the reduced game of …rms 1 and 2 for given prices of the other …rms, we can conclude that p R 1 < p B 1 . Using the same logic we can show that p R 2 < p B 2 : This result holds for any two …rms and any price vector of the other …rms. Therefore we can conclude that in equilibrium p R i < p B i 8i: Figure 2 illustrates the logic of the proof above. Note that if the underlying Bertrand oligopoly is supermodular, but with multiple equilibria, then there always exists an equilibrium under a relative auditing rule with prices lower than the lowest equilibrium prices under a …xed rule. 11
A numerical example
In this section we present a simple numerical example in order to illustrate the e¤ects of a relative audit rule. Suppose that the underlying market structure is a symmetric Cournot duopoly with linear inverse demand (with parameters a and b) and constant marginal cost c. Then the gross pro…t of …rm i is simply given by: We can interpret as the default probability, while x determines the responsiveness of the audit rule to unequal declarations. Furthermore, we assume quadratic evasion costs with a scaling factor k:
The tax and …ne systems are linear with proportionality factors t and f: Table 1 shows the impact of a relative audit rule for the parameter vector (a = 10; b = 1; c = 1; = :2; x = :2; k = 20; f = :4; t = :4).
In our example the relative audit rule slightly increases the surplus (by 1 percent), while the …rst dividend -the reduction in tax evasion -is much more pronounced. We conducted a wide range of simulations to get a feel for the size of the di¤erent e¤ects. We found that the e¢ ciency gains are usually Table 1 : Impact of a relative rule small compared to the reduction in evasion. However, a relative audit rule that does the job of reducing tax evasion and additionally comes with a second dividend -a moderate increase in e¢ ciency -is highly desirable. It has to be noted though that a relative audit rule does not seem suitable as a primary instrument to solve ine¢ ciency problems due to market power.
Conclusions
This paper has focused on a relatively neglected aspect of tax compliance. It has shown that market structure matters in tax enforcement, a result that is in sharp contrast to the neutrality results that are typical in the literature. We have seen that, in standard models of industrial organisation, the enforcement policy a¤ects …rms' behaviour in two dimensions -their market behaviour as well as their compliance behaviour. Appropriate design of the enforcement policy can thus have a "double dividend." The relative audit rule has an advantage over the independent rule and even over a system without taxation if the e¢ ciency of outputs is concerned. A relative audit rule creates externalities on the declaration of pro…ts, which spill over to the quantity or price decision. In the quantity-competition model this audit rule leads to higher outputs than in a pure Cournot oligopoly. Because an audit regime which treats each …rm independently does not impose those externalities, under such a regime the quantity choice is not in ‡uenced by the tax-evasion decision and the Cournot quantities are produced. Similar conclusions apply in a price-competition model.
